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SECTION 558(c) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT: PROVISION FOR 
INFORMAL AGENCY HEARINGS PRIOR 
TO LICENSE REVOCATION OR 
SUSPENSION 
Section 558(c) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 1 
prescribes procedures federal agencies must follow in all phases of the 
licensing process, including license application, license revocation or 
suspension, and continuation of a license pending a renewal decision. 
It provides that, prior to suspension or revocation2 of a federal license, 3 
an agency must give a licensee written notice and an "opportunity to 
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. " 4 
1. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)). 
2. The exact wording of the Act is "withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment." 
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982). For the purposes of this Note, these actions will be referred to as 
"revocation and suspension." 
3. The APA broadly defines the term "license" to include agency permits, certificates, ap-
provals, registrations, charters, memberships, statutory exemptions, and other forms of permis-
sion. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (1982). 
A wide range of "licenses" are subject to the procedural requirements of § 558(c). See, e.g., 
Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1072 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982) (customs broker's 
special entry permit); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (nuclear power plant 
construction permit); New York Pathological & X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79 
(2d Cir. 1975) (approval of laboratory for medical testing of aliens seeking residency); Blackwell 
College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (approval of 
school for attendance by nonimmigrant alien students). 
4. Section 558(c) states in full: 
(c) When application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with due 
regard for the rights and privileges of all the interested parties or adversely affected 
persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and complete proceedings required to 
be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title or other proceedings 
required by law and shall make its decision. Except in cases of willfulness or those 
in which public health, interest or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspen-
sion, revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the institution 
of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given -
0) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the 
action; and 
(2) opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. 
When the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for a renewal or a 
new license in accordance with agency rules, a license with reference to an activity 
of a continuing nature does not expire until the application has been finally deter-
mined by the agency. 
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982). 
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It is unclear whether this provision requires an agency to conduct 
a hearing prior to suspension or revocation. Three circuits have sug-
gested that section 558(c) requires an agency to conduct hearings before 
revoking or suspending a license. s In contrast, the Seventh Circuit 
recently held that hearings are not necessary. 6 
Uncertainty also exists regarding the type of hearing, if any, im-
posed by section 558(c). 1 Only two courts imposing a hearing require-
ment reached the issue of what procedural formality is required. Both 
concluded that formal hearings, consistent with the requirements of 
sections 556 and 557 of the AP A, are always necessary. 8 
This Note argues that section 558(c) should be interpreted to require 
an agency to provide a hearing9 prior to license suspension or 
revocation. 10 Part I argues that all courts that have adjudicated whether 
5. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 
530 F.2d 625, 635 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); New York Pathological 
& X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). 
6. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074-76 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Note, 
Section 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act: Is a Formal Hearing to Demonstrate Com-
pliance Required Before License Revocation or Suspension?, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1436, 1440-48 
(1983) (concluding that § 558(c) cannot be interpreted to require a hearing). 
7. The term "hearing" is flexible. At one extreme, it includes an oral process, a trial-type 
adjudication with cross-examination and the chance to present rebuttal witnesses. At the other 
extreme, the opportunity to be "heard" may merely require the consideration of written com-
ments submitted in an informal adjudicatory process. Cf. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum 
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972) (holding that the due process right to be heard in a 
rulemaking proceeding did not require a trial-type adjudication). As used in this Note, "hear-
ing" is intended to describe a procedure providing, at a minimum, an opportunity for the licensee 
to obtain access to the evidence supporting the revocation or suspension decision and to present 
its own rebuttal evidence. In Part II, further consideration is given to the elements of a hearing 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of § 558. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text. 
8. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); New York Pathological & X-Ray 
Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). 
9. As developed in Part II, this Note contends that, depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case, § 558(c) may require anything from the submission of written responses to the 
agency's evidence to a full blown trial-type hearing. The only type of hearing not available under 
§ 558(c) is a formal hearing meeting all the requirements of §§ 556-557 of the APA. See infra 
notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
10. The Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), does not preclude this interpretation of§ 558(c). 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts may not, in the rulemaking context, 
require the agencies to adopt procedures more stringent than those required by the APA. The 
Court specifically stated that there was "little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion 
of the agencies and not that of the courts was to be exercised in determining when extra pro-
cedural devices should be employed." Id. at 546. There are two reasons why this restrictive language 
does not apply in the context of license revocation. 
First, the Court's admonishment in Vermont Yankee was directed toward judicial activism 
in the area of informal rule-making; the Court was not faced with an issue involving informal 
adjudication, the type of agency procedure at issue in the interpretation of § 558(c). Rulemaking 
and adjudication are distinct types of decision making under the APA. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 
551(5), 553 (1982) (rulemaking) with 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(7), 554 (1982) (adjudication). The APA 
provides for both formal and informal rulemaking, compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 556, 557 (1982) 
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section 558(c) requires a hearing have misconstrued the statute by fail-
ing to consider the general policies served by the APA. Part II ex-
amines section 558(c) in light of the major policies of the APA, unifor-
mity and fairness in administrative procedure. It argues that these 
policies are best served by an interpretation that requires a hearing 
prior to suspension or revocation of any federal license. It does, 
however, recognize exceptions consistent with those policies. Finally, 
Part II argues that the policies of fairness and uniformity suggest that 
the procedural formalities necessary to comply with the hearing re-
quirement vary with the circumstances of each case. 
I. THE DISPUTED HEARING REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 558(c) 
A. Judicial Interpretations 
Section 558(c) establishes the minimal procedures that must be 
followed before an agency may suspend or revoke a federal license. 11 
(formal) with 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (b), (d), (e) (1982) (informal), but it establishes procedures for 
only formal adjudication, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982). Although the APA includes protec-
tions that apply generally (§§ 552, 555, 702), no provision of the APA besides § 558 specifies 
procedures to be followed in the case of informal adjudication. Rolfe, The Requirement of For-
mal Adjudication Under the APA: When is Section 554(a) Triggered so as to Require Applica-
tion of Sections 554, 556 and 557?, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 98 (1980). Without explicit provisions 
for informal adjudication, it can be argued that the courts remain free to establish federal com-
mon law procedures in the area of informal adjudication under § 558(c). Cf Milwaukee v. Il-
linois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1980) (federal courts may develop common law when compelled to 
consider federal questions that federal statutes cannot answer); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The 
APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the· Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 385, 391-92, 395; 
Westen & Lehman, ls There Life For Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REV. 
311, 331-41 (1980). An alternative explanation for the failure of Congress to provide for informal 
adjudication within the APA is that it intended informal adjudications to be governed solely 
by the provisions of the organic statutes. But see Scalia, supra, at 391, 394 (rejecting this argument). 
Second, even if this common law prerogative does not exist with respect to all types of infor-
mal adjudication, it should ·at least exist in the license revocation context. Here, Congress not 
Ol)lY gave very little procedural guidance but, at the same time, indicated the need to prevent 
the agencies from acting arbitrarily. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
It has also been suggested that the result of Vermont Yankee was, to a large degree, a function 
of the clear mandate of Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act, to develop nuclear power. Without 
such a strong mandate, a court may find it necessary to impose additional procedural protec-
tions. Casenote, Administrative Law - Reviewing Courts Restricted from Imposing Procedures 
for Informal Rulemaking Beyond Those Specified in Section 553 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act or Other Relevant Statutes - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 411, 424 (1979); 
see also s. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 77-78 (Supp. 
1982). 
I I. The Senate Committee Report on the Act asserted that, "[b]y enacting this bill, the Con-
gress - expressing the will of the people - will be laying down for the guidance of all branches 
of the Government and all private interests in the country a policy respecting the minimum re~ 
quirements of fair administrative procedure." S. REP. No. 7S2, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1945) 
[hereinafter cited ass. REP.), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE AcT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1946) 
[hereinafter cited as LEGJS. HISTORY). 
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The agency must provide written notice of the facts or conduct war-
ranting the action, and it must provide an opportunity for the licensee 
to "demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements." 12 
The AP A does not specify what procedures are necessary to comply 
with the latter provision. 13 
The issue arises in cases of agency suspension or revocation where 
the agency is not required by law, other than the APA, to hold a preter-
mination hearing. Such external hearing requirements do exist in a great 
number of cases. If a property interest is involved, the due process 
12. 5 U .S.C. § 558(c) (I 982). 
13. Although the requirement is expressed in the disjunctive, "demonstrate" or "achieve," 
the courts do not often make clear which part of the disjunctive they are applying. See, e.g., 
Shuck v. SEC, 264 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (conversations between parties and agency 
officials prior to agency action sufficient to establish "notice and opportunity to comply"). When 
they have made the distinction, the majority of courts have focused on the word "achieve." 
They have required that a licensee be given a "second chance" to achieve compliance, an oppor-
tunity to "put its house in lawful order before more formal agency proceedings are undertaken." 
George Steinberg & Son, Inc. v. Butz, 491 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 
(1974); Twigger v. Schultz, 484 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1973); Blackwell College of Business v. 
Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n 
Co., 4ll U.S. 182, 185 (1973); American Fruit Purveyors, Inc. v. United States, 630 F.2d 370, 
374 (5th Cir. 1980); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 821 n.2 
(1st Cir. 1965); Great Lakes Airlines v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 228-29 (D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961). 
Even when courts appear to have considered the impact of the word "demonstrate," their 
choice of language reveals their uncertainty. Although only one court has rested its holding on 
the flat assertion that § 558(c) requires a full adjudicatory hearing, New York Pathological & 
X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975), several courts have indicated 
their confusion by loosely referring to the provision as one requiring an opportunity to be heard, 
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 634 (5th Cir. 1976) ("notice and hear-
ing procedure"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, No. 
76-C-3499 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1981) (available Nov. i2, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. 
file) ("notice and hearing requirements"), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1982). 
Arguably, the phrase "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" could be read as 
a whole to mean nothing more than a second chance to measure up to whatever criteria an 
agency uses to monitor compliance. Use of the disjunctive, however, normally indicates alter-
natives and requires that each word be treated separately. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 582 F.2d 834, 840 n.10 (4th Cir. 1978); Azure 
v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1975). 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 46.06, at 63 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973). 
Two different circumstances can be envisioned where a licensee would assert the right to an 
opportunity to "demonstrate" compliance. In the first, the licensee admits to initial noncompliance 
but desires to demonstrate that it has used its "second chance" to come back into compliance. 
In the second, the licensee asserts that it was never out of compliance; thus, it does not intend 
to achieve, but merely to "demonstrate," compliance. Although the legislative history speaks 
extensively to the former situation, it does not address the latter. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE PRINT, JUNE 
1945 (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note ll, at 35 ("The second sentence 
is designed to preclude the withdrawal of licenses, except in cases of willfulness or the stated 
cases of urgency, without affording the licensee an opportunity for the correction of the conduct 
questioned by the agency."). This void in the legislative history allows the courts even greater 
leeway to interpret "demonstrate" broadly in circumstances where a licensee challenges the agency's 
initial determination of noncompliance. 
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clause of the Constitution may require a hearing. 14 Many statutes govern-
ing federal licenses incorporate provisions for hearings prior to revoca-
tion or suspension. 1 ' Even when the governing statute does not require 
one, a number of agency regulations provide an opportunity for a 
hearing. 16 Absent an external hearing requirement, however, the 
minimal requirements of section 558(c) govern. 
In such cases, courts must consider two different questions. First, 
does section 558(c) require a hearing prior to revocation or suspen-
sion? Second, if a hearing is required, what type of hearing does the 
agency'have to provide? 
On the first question, the courts have reached conflicting results. 
Three federal circuit courts have concluded that section 558(c) always 
requires a hearing. 11 The Seventh Circuit recently disagreed and held 
14. See infra notes 49, SO & SS and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 85 (1982) (licensed grain inspector entitled to a hearing before license 
can be suspended, revoked, or not renewed); 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b), (c)(2), (d) (1982) (hearing re-
quirement prior to suspension or cancellation of pesticide registration); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) 
(1982) (opportunity for hearing prior to revocation of securities broker-dealer registration); 19 
U.S.C. § 164l(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (hearing required prior to revocation of customs brokers 
license); 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1976) (opportunity for hearing prior to revocation of broadcast 
license); 49 U.S.C. § 137l(g) (Supp. V 1981) (hearing prior to revocation of air carrier certificate 
of public convenience). · 
When the governing statute provides for a hearing "on the record," minimal standards for 
the hearing are established by§§ 556-557 of the APA. See, e.g., Ligon Specialized Hauler, Inc. 
v. ICC, 587 F.2d 304, 315 (6th Cir. 1978); Twigger v. Schultz, 484 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1973); 
Jaffee & Co. v. SEC, 446 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Format adjudication in these cases is triggered by § 554(a), not by§ 558(c). In the adjudicatory 
context, the formal standards of §§ 556-557 are triggered by § 554(a) "in every case of adjudica-
tion required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing 
.... " Thus, if a governing statute does not require that a hearing be conducted, §§ 556-557 
do not come into play. Cf Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950) (broadening 
the triggering function of § 554(a) by interpreting "required by statute" to mean required by 
statute or by the due process clause of the Constitution). See generally Rolfe, supra note IO, 
at 97-131; Note, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under Section 5 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 12 HARV. J. ON LE0IS. 194, 205-43 (1975). 
If the statute requires a "hearing," but does not use the "on the record" language, courts 
often look to congressional intent to determine whether§§ 556-557 nevertheless apply. See, e.g., 
United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Seacoast 
Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); 
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977). 
16. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. § 78.25(c) (1983) (hearing prior to withdrawal of approval of stockyard 
under animal quarantine laws); 9 C.F.R. § 162 (1983) ("informal conference" required prior 
to revocation or suspension of veterinary accreditation). 
Under the interpretation proposed by this Note, these regulations would be subject to judicial 
review on the question whether the procedural formalities provided by the regulations were suffi-
cient to satisfy the purpose of § 558(c). See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text. 
17. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 
530 F.2d 625, 635 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); New York Pathological 
& X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). 
The District of Columbia Circuit concluded in Porter County that § 558(c) required a hearing 
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that section 558(c) never requires a hearing. 18 
Of the courts finding a hearing requirement, only two reached the 
second question. Both of these courts determined that section 558(c) 
requires a formal hearing consistent with sections 556 and 557 of the 
AP A. 19 Those sections provide for an impartial presiding officer, a hearing 
of record with an opportunity to present a defense and conduct cross-
examination, and a standard of judicial review requiring that the deci-
sion be supported by substantial evidence of record. 20 
B. Inadequacies of the' Judicial Interpretations 
The courts that have adjudicated whether section 558(c) requires a 
hearing have ignored the complexities of that section. Courts holding 
that 558( c) always requires a hearing have ignored certain. language 
in the statute. In contrast, courts holding that 558(c) never requires 
a hearing have given insufficient weight to the general purposes of the 
APA. 
I. Courts holding a hearing is always required- Two different ra-
tionales appear to have governed the decisions concluding that section 
558(c) always requires a hearing. Two courts noted that the language 
of the first sentence of section 558(c) provides, in the license applica-
tion setting, for proceedings consistent with sections 556 and 557 of 
the APA. 21 These courts apparently concluded that the formal hearing 
requirements of those sections applied in the revocation context as well. 
meeting the standards of §§ 556-557 prior to revocation or suspension of a permit to construct 
a nuclear power plant. 606 F.2d at 1368 & n.12. Section 186(b) of the Atomic Energy Act pro-
vides that § 558(c) of the APA applies to any revocation proceeding under the Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2236(b) (1976). 
The plaintiff in Bankers asserted a right to a hearing before revocation of its dredge-and-fill 
permit granted under the Rivers and Harbors Act. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the permit 
had become null and void of its own terms and was, therefore, not revoked and not subject 
to § 558(c). 530 F.2d at 634-35. 
In New York Pathological, the Second Circuit held that§ 558(c) required the INS to conduct 
hearings prior to the revocation of a laboratory's certification to perform the medical examina-
tions necessary for aliens entering the United States. 523 F.2d at 82. The precedential value of 
New York Pathological is limited by its procedural context. Because the licensee sought a 
preliminary injunction, the court only had to find a likelihood of success on the merits. See 
also id. at 84 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case should have been treated as a license 
application, rather than a license revocation). 
18. In Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1982), the Customs Service 
had suspended the plaintiff's special entry customs permit. The Seventh Circuit held that § 558(c) 
provided no independent basis for requiring a hearing prior to that suspension. 687 F.2d at 1073-76. 
19. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); New York Pathological & X-Ray 
Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). 
20. See 5 V.S.C. §§ 556, 557, 706(2)(E) (1982). 
21. See Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); New York Pathological & X-Ray 
Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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Another court reasoned that the language in section 558(c) requiring 
"notice . . . and opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" 
also mandated a hearing. 22 Both rationales appear incorrect. 
A close analysis of the structure of section 558(c) dispels the first 
theory. Each sentence of that section refers to a distinct phase of the 
licensing process. The first sentence refers to license application, the 
second to revocation or suspension, and the third to continuation of 
a license during the pendency of an agency's renewal decision. 23 Each 
must be read independently of the others. 24 Thus, the reference in the 
first sentence to the formal hearing requirements of sections 556 and 
557 is not relevant in the revocation or suspension context. 25 
The second rationale is contradicted by the express language and 
the legislative history. It must be assumed that Congress's choice of 
the phrase "opportunity to demonstrate . . . compliance" was pur-
poseful. If it intended to require a hearing in all cases, it could simply 
have used the phrase "opportunity for a hearing." Moreover, the reports 
of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees clearly indicate that 
22. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977). 
23. See supra note 4. 
24. An early interpretation of the APA by the Attorney General concluded that § 558(c) 
"is composed of three sentences, each of which is mutually exclusive of the others." UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE AcT 89 (1947) [hereinafter cited as A.G. MANUAL). The Attorney General's Manual 
is a "contemporaneous interpretation" entitled to "some deference ... because of the role 
played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978). 
25. Moreover, the legislative history supports the view that, even in the license application 
context, no independent right to a hearing was created. The House Judiciary Committee clearly 
specified that the first sentence "does not provide for a hearing where other statutes do not 
do so." H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.), 
reprinted in LEms. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 275. 
After some initial confusion, the courts have firmly rejected the argument that, in the license 
application setting, a hearing is independently required by § 558(c). In City of West Chicago 
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh 
Circuit overruled its previous holding, in United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th 
Cir. 1977), that the APA required a formal hearing in this context. The fact that the early prece-
dent was still in force explains some of the contorted logic of the Gallagher & Ascher opinion, 
where the court admits that "[o]ur interpretation of section 558(c) in U.S. Steel may bear reex-
amination .... " Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1075 (7th Cir. 1982). See 
Rolfe, supra note 10, at 120-21 ("(T)he Seventh Circuit committed a cardinal sin of statutory 
construction."); see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.11 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Taylor v. District Eng'rs, U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 
567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1260-61 n.25 
(9th Cir. 1977); Lincoln Transit Co. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 990, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(three-judge panel); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.10, at 447, 450 (2d ed. 
1979). If the first sentence of§ 558(c) does not require a full adjudicatory proceeding for license 
applications, that same language cannot be found to support by implication such a requirement 
in the revocation setting. 
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Congress did not anticipate that hearings would be held in every case 
of revocation or suspension. 26 
2. Courts holding a hearing is never required- The Seventh Cir-
cuit based its holding that section 558(c) never requires a hearing on 
the legislative history of that section. 21 It quoted the House Judiciary 
Committee's statement that section 558(c) "does not provide for a hear-
ing where other statutes do not do so," 21 and concluded that Congress 
did not intend for section 558(c) to provide an independent basis for 
a hearing. 29 
The language of the committee report, however, is more ambiguous 
than the Seventh Circuit recognized. The committee reference to a "hear-
ing" might be taken to refer only to the formal adjudicatory proceedings 
required by sections 556 and 557, rather than to more informal agency 
hearings. The historical context of the passage of the APA supports 
this narrow reading of the committee's reference to a "hearing." In 
1946, when a case was contested before an agency, the standard pro-
cedure was to conduct a full adjudicatory hearing. 30 By pointing out 
that section 558 did not provide for a hearing, the committee may have 
been clarifying its intent that this section not impose a formal hearing 
requirement. 31 Thus, the reference to "hearings" in the report does 
not foreclose the possibility that informal hearings might, under some 
circumstances, be required to demonstrate compliance. 32 
26. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
27. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1072-76 (7th Cir. 1982). 
28. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 41, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 275; 
see also S. REP., supra note II, at 25, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 211. 
29. Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir. 1982). 
30. The 1947 Attorney General's Manual noted that, even if a controlling statute did not 
specify that a hearing was to be conducted "on the record," it was generally assumed that a 
full evidentiary hearing meeting the requirements of §§ 556-557 was contemplated in the critical 
license revocation context. A.G. MANUAL, supra note 24, at 42; see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution 
League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 n.11 (1st Cir.) (noting that Congress probably "assumed 
that most licensing would be governed by §§ 556 and 557"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); 
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 14.2, at 5 (Supp. 1982); Scalia, supra note 10, at 381. 
31. All references in the Act itself to "hearings" are to the formal hearings of §§ 556 and 
551. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a)-(b), 556 (1982). 
32. Even. if Congress did not intend for the procedures available under § 558(c) to include 
any sort of hearing, such an intent has l;>een rendered meaningless by the drastic changes in 
administrative law that have occurred over the past 40 years. During that time, both agency 
practice and court-made law have developed in ways that severely limit the ability of a reviewing 
court to take evidence beyond the existing administrative record, no matter how meager that record. 
In 1946, the understanding of Congress was that "the established law permits a trial de novo 
of the facts in all cases of adjudications where statutes do not require an administrative hear-
ing." STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE PRINT, JUNE 1945 (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, 
at 22; see also S. REP., supra note II, at 6, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 192; 
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 791-92 (1948); Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 
(1934); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, Ill U.S. 701, 708, 711-12 (1884). 
That is no longer the case. Now, when a licensee is not granted a hearing at the agency level, 
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Further, the Seventh Circuit failed to consider that its decision never 
to require a hearing undercut the purpose of section 558(c). That sec-
tion exists to limit the discretion of government agencies in their licens-
ing decisions. 33 Congress intended to impose procedural requirements 
that would prevent an agency from summarily revoking or suspending 
a license without an adequate basis. 34 If the section is to serve as a 
limitation, some procedure, such as a hearing, that requires an agency 
to consider a licensee's evidence prior to revocation or suspension may 
the result is that there is no opportunity to cross-examine or provide evidence of factual issues 
that may be outcome determinative. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (holding 
that the authority of courts to conduct de novo evidentiary hearings is strictly limited); Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971) (courts engage in de novo 
review only in limited circumstances); Scalia, supra note 10, at 377 (noting that agencies have 
responded to the rigorous requirements of APA§§ 556-557 by switching from formal adjudicatory 
proceedings to informal rulemaking and informal adjudication); Pedersen, Formal Records and 
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 42 (1975) (noting that "[d]uring the past decade, the 
courts have used the latitude left them ... to pare down any right to an adjudicatory hearing 
in complicated regulatory programs"). See generally Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Ad-
ministrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 721 (1975). 
If the legislators had been aware of the extreme deference now given by courts to agency 
decisions or the limitations on the ability of a court to conduct a de novo review, they may 
have thought twice before foregoing a hearing requirement. One commentator has concluded 
that, in light of the drastically new setting, courts have a "positive obligation to 'reinterpret' " 
portions of the APA in order to prevent the courts' own actions from subverting the Act's basic 
intent. Scalia, supra note 10, at 382, 395. 
33. Section 558(a) states that the section applies to "the exercise of a power or authority." 
Both § 558(b) and (c) serve to limit that power. 5 U.S.C. § 558 (1982). 
One limitation imposed is that an agency may not revoke a license before giving sufficient 
notice and an opportunity to comply. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c); see George Steinberg & Son, Inc. v. 
Butz, 491 F.2d 988, 993-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). Another limitation im-
posed by the same section is the provision that, if a licensee has made a timely application for 
a renewal or a new license, a license governing an activity of a continuing nature does not expire 
until the application has been finally determined by the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982). 
34. See S. REP., supra note II, at 26, reprinted in LEGIS. H1sroRY, supra note II, at 212 
(the exceptions of § 558(c) do not "confer upon agencies an arbitrary discretion to ignore the 
requirement of notice and an opportunity to demonstrate compliance"). 
The legislative history confirms the inference, drawn from the express language, that § 558 
was intended to serve as a limitation on agency power. The report of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee states that the Act provides "some general limitations upon administrative powers and 
sanctions, particularly in the rigorous field of licensing." H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 12, reprinted 
in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 246; see also 92 CONG. REC. 5654 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. 
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 368 (comments of Rep. Walter, chairman of the subcommittee that 
reported out the House version of the bill). See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 13, § 48.13, 
at 216 (explanatory statements by a member of the standing committee in charge of presentation 
of a bill entitled to weight). 
Although most of the Act reflected the recommendations of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure, § 558(c)'s treatment of licensing was one area where the ad-
visory committee's report had not been stringent enough. Thus, after congressional hearings, 
the limitations in§ 558 were added. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 12, ·reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, 
supra note II, at 246; see also S. REP., supra note II, at 6-7, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, 
supra note II, at 192-93; S. REP., supra note II, at 7, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 
11, at 194 (describing § 558 as a section providing for "limitations upon sanctions and powers"). 
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be implicitly required. 35 The court did not consider whether its deci-
sion left intact such a check on the agency. 
Only an examination of the policies of the AP A as a whole can resolve 
the issue of whether section 558(c) requires a hearing prior to license 
revocation or suspension. The express language, when properly con-
strued, does not address the issue in the revocation and suspension 
context. The legislative history is ambiguous. Thus, consideration must 
be given to the overall goals served by the AP A. 36 The courts failed 
to do this. 
II. THE PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 558(c) 
The major policies of the APA, fairness and uniformity, are decisive 
in the interpretation of section 558(c). As a general rule, these goals 
are best served if that section is read to require a hearing. The policies 
of fairness and uniformity also relate to the nature of the hearing re-
quired. Contrary to the courts requiring formal hearings in all cases, 
this Note concludes that the type of hearing prescribed by section 
558(c) varies with the circumstances of a given case. 
A. The Hearing Requirement 
I. Justification for the hearing requirement- The major goals of 
the APA are uniformity and fairness in administrative procedure. 37 
The AP A was enacted in 1946, in part, because of the concern that 
administrative agencies were developing into an unchecked fourth branch 
of government. 38 Congress recognized that the agencies had great power 
to make decisions affecting individuals. 39 Thus, the establishment of 
35. When an agency revocation decision is appealed to the courts, the standard of review 
is that described in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A): the court may hold the action unlawful only if it 
is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." As 
a practical matter, it is rare for a court to overturn an agency action based on this standard 
of review. See, e.g., Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973) (reversing a 
court of appeals decision holding that a 20-day suspension was invalid because it was more severe 
than sanctions given to others for similar violations of the Packers and Stockyards Act). 
36. According to Senator McCarran, the APA "is a coherent whole; no section or paragraph 
of the bill is completely independent; all parts of it are closely interrelated. The bill must be 
read and considered as a whole, and in this case the whole is considerably more than the sum 
of its parts." 92 CoNo. REc. 2150 (1946), reprinted in LEoIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 302; 
see also J. StrrHERLAND, supra note 13, § 46.05, at 48. 
37. See infra notes 40-42. 
38. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 8, reprinted in LEOIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 242. 
39. The concern for fairness in the licensing context was expressed by Representative Walter, 
chairman of the House subcommittee designated to review the bill: 
[Section 558 is] necessary because of the very severe consequences of the conferring 
of licensing authority upon administrative agencies. The burden is upon private parties 
to apply for licenses or renewals. If agencies are dilatory in either kind of application, 
parties are subjected to irreparable injuries unless safeguards are provided. The pur-
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minimal standards of fair procedure was of primary concern to the 
drafters of the AP A. 40 
The drafters also intended to promote uniformity. They sought to 
facilitate predictability, both at the agency level and upon judicial review, 
by creating uniform rules of practice and procedure. 41 Thus, whether 
section 558(c) requires a hearing must be resolved by considering whether 
a hearing requirement would advance or detract from the policies of 
uniformity and fairness. 
a. The policy of uniformity- Concerns about uniformity may focus 
on uniformity within an agency or uniformity between agencies. The 
focus of the drafters of the AP A appears to have been on interagency 
uniformity. 42 Their goal of providing a predictable, judicially reviewable 
pose of this section is to remove the threat of disastrous, arbitrary, and irremediable 
administrative action. 
92 CoNG. REC. 5654 (1946), reprinted in LEms. HISTORY, supra note II, at 368; see also 92 
CONG. REC. 2149 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 298 (comments of Sen. 
McCarran). 
40. The preamble to the Act affirms the goal of Congress "[t]o improve the administration 
of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure." Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. 
L. No. 79-404, preamble, 60 Stat. 237, 237 (1946). See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 
31, § 47.02, at 71 (the "preamble expresses in the most satisfactory manner the reason and pur-
pose of the act"). 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary expressed the view that "[b)y enacting this bill, the 
Congress - expressing the will of the people - will be laying down for the guidance of all 
branches of the Government and all private interests in the country a policy respecting the minimum 
requirements of fair administrative procedure." S. REP, supra note 11, at 31, reprinted in LEGIS. 
HISTORY, supra note II, at 217; see also H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 16, reprinted in LEGIS. 
HISTORY, supra note II, at 250. 
41. The need for uniformity in agency procedures motivated the enactment of the APA. 
As early as 1939, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a total lack of procedural guidance 
in the exercise of quasi-judicial power by federal agencies. The committee concluded that because 
of this void one agency could not benefit from the collective procedural experience of other 
agencies; courts were compelled to treat procedural issues in one agency as distinct from those 
of other agencies; and individuals and their attorneys tended to emphasize the importance of 
judicial review, rather than focusing on the agency proceeding itself. H.R. REP., supra note 
25, at 9, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 243. When Senator McCarran presented 
the AP A to the Senate in 1946, he stressed the importance of letting the public and potential 
parties to administrative proceedings understand the processes to be used to determine their rights. 
92 CONG. REc. 2149, 2151 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 298-99, 304; 
see also A.G. MANUAL, supra note 24, at 5. 
42. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 16, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note II, at 250. 
Commentators have questioned the value of interagency uniformity. On the one hand, if all 
agencies follow similar procedures, an individual or business that deals with more than one agency 
will find it easier to understand the procedures used, the agencies could potentially learn from 
the experience of other agencies, and judicial review would be more evenhanded. See Note, supra 
note 15, at 198. On the other hand, each agency administers a distinct subject matter and may 
be able to call on its experience to tailor a procedure to fit a specific situation. Id. at 198 nn.19-20; 
see also Scalia, supra note 10, at 408 (suggesting that the APA be amended to provide ten or 
fifteen basic procedural formats and to require that the Judiciary Committees of both Houses 
approve any procedure before it is inserted in new legislation). 
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set of rules, however, applies to differences among distinct agencies 
and to those within different branches or offices of the same agency. 
Interagency uniformity is unaffected by the presence or absence of 
a hearing requirement. If section 558(c) did not so require, the agency 
would conduct a hearing only when mandated by statute or regulation 
or when the agency chose to grant one. 43 Thus, the discretion to re-
quire a hearing would rest with Congress or the agencies. If the alter-
native proposed by this Note were adopted, a hearing would be re-
quired unless the case fell within a judicially defined exception. Thus, 
the discretionary power to require a hearing would be shifted from 
Congress and the agencies to the courts. The difference concerns who 
decides the uniformity issue; presumably, the amount of interagency 
uniformity would not change because of a different decision maker. 
Intraagency uniformity, however, would be increased by an inter-
pretation of section 558(c) that required a hearing. Without a hearing 
requirement, each office of an agency can utilize whatever procedures 
it deems sufficient. Under that interpretation, the practice of one 
regional office is likely to be different from that of another regional 
office. 44 If, instead, section 558(c) were read to require a hearing, once 
a court decided that a hearing was necessary in one case, each regional 
office would be obliged to provide the same procedural protections. 
b. The policy off airness- The legislative history reveals that the 
APA drafters sought to achieve fairness by balancing the interests of 
the licensees and agencies. The committee reports and statements of 
sponsors reveal Congress's concern that the rights of licensees be 
protected.45 Yet, the drafters were also mindful of the need to minimize 
administrative costs. 46 Congress envisioned that, at some point, the 
administrative burden could become so excessive that additional pro-
43. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 6, at 1444. 
44. For example, in Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1982), 
the Chicago office of the Customs Service adopted guidelines specifying that more than five 
late entries justified institution of suspension proceedings. In a different entry city, the informal 
guidelines might have specified that ten late entries triggered suspension. Cf Gerhart, Judicial 
Review of Customs Service Actions, 9 LAW & Poucv IN INT'L Bus. 1101, 1120 (1977) (noting 
that "[c]ustoms apparently has no workable formal procedures for systematically reviewing the 
treatment given to imports at the various ports"). 
45. See supra note 39. As noted by one court, "[t]he wide latitude and discretion inevitably 
given to executive officials and administrative agencies in regard to enforcement policy puts upon 
them a corresponding obligation to institute and abide by procedures that give affected persons 
a meaningful opportunity, before adverse decisions are crystallized, to make an appeal to their 
discretion." Blackwell Colle_ge of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928,932 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
46. See S. REP., supra note ll, at 5, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note ll, at 191 
("the committee has attempted to make sure that no operation of the Government is unduly 
restricted"); H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 16, reprinted in LEOIS. HISTORY, supra note ll, at 
250 ("the bill does not unduly encroach upon the needs of any legitimate goverment operation"). 
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cedural protections would not be feasible. 47 Thus, fairness under the 
AP A should be determined by balancing the potential for wrongful 
deprivation of the licensee against the administrative costs of providing 
increased procedural protections. 
One implication of using a balancing approach to determine fairness 
is that, in some cases, it will be fair to grant licenses greater procedural 
protections than in other cases. For example, a securities broker fac-
ing a ten-day suspension of its license deserves some procedural pro-
tections to ass~re that the rationale for the suspension is valid. Because 
the suspension is for a short duration, however, it may be desirable 
only to provide the broker with notice, full disclosure of the evidence 
against it, and an opportunity to respond to that evidence. On the 
other hand, if the penalty were a permanent revocation of the license, 
it would make sense to require that an adjudicatory hearing be held 
to substantiate the basis for the revocation. 48 
The doctrine developed by the courts in the administrative due pro-
cess area provides a useful analogy. In that context, the courts are 
applying a concept of fairness that requires a balancing of interests. 49 
As a result of the balancing approach, courts exhibit great flexibility 
in their choice of procedural remedies. If a private interest rises to 
the level of "property" protected by the due process clause, the remedy 
is not automatically a full trial-type hearing. Rather, the extent of the 
procedural remedy is a function of the balance of the potential for 
wrongful deprivation against the value of the government interest in 
not providing a hearing. ,o 
47. The drafters used conclusory labels to describe this critical point. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report indicates that the Act was intended to protect private parties, even at the 
risk of "some incidental or possible inconvenience to or change in present administrative opera-
tions." S. REP., supra note 11, at 5, reprinted in LEOIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 191 (em-
phasis added). Similarly, the House Report described the Act as an effort to protect licensees 
"without unduly interfering with necessary governmental operations." H.R. REP., supra note 
25, at 8, reprinted in LEOIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 242 (emphasis added). In his discussion 
of the general structure of the APA, C.ongressman Walter commented that "[t)o require hears 
ings in all cases would add unnecessary burdens in the business of government and would at 
the same time deprive the citizen of the need for speed where quick action is desirable." 92 
CONG. •REC. 5648 (1946), reprinted in LEOIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 352. 
48. Through the combined effect of the governing statute and the SEC regulations, this result 
is reached in the securities regulation context. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 
240.15b7-l, 201.11, 201.11.1, 201.14 (1983). 
49. The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), held that the 
scope of the process due to an individual threatened with deprivation of a protectible property 
interest depends on: (I) the nature of the private interest affected by the agency action; (2) the 
value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including its in-
terest in minimizing the administrative burdens imposed by additional procedural requirements. 
50. For example, in Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 936 
n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court reversed an INS decision to withdraw the college's status as 
a school approved for attendance by nonimmigrant aliens. The court remanded to the agency, 
suggesting that due process in that context required a hearing before an impartial agency official, 
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An interpretation of section 558(c) that never requires a hearing would 
fail to provide such flexibility. Instead, when faced with a case of in-
adequate preterrnination procedures, a court would be required to choose 
one of two discrete remedies. If a law external to the APA required 
a hearing on the record under section 554, the agency would have to 
provide a hearing with the full panoply of procedural rights set forth 
in sections 556 and 557.' 1 If, however, no external law existed and 
section 558(c) governed, the most that a court could require would 
be some form of written notice and an opportunity to petition the agency 
informally.' 2 Courts could avoid this harsh result by stretching their 
interpretations of the governing statutes to find a requirement of a 
hearing on the record. 53 Absent such willingness to construe the gover-
ning statute in this way, however, even a licensee facing a potentially 
harmful deprivation where the cost of an administrative hearing is low 
would be limited to receiving notice and an opportunity to petition 
the agency informally. 
An interpretation of section 558(c) that requires a hearing, by pro-
an opportunity to cross-examine persons who supplied evidence, and participation by counsel 
in those proceedings. 
In National Rifle Ass'n v. United States Postal Service, 407 F. Supp. 88, 95 (D.D.C. 1976), 
the postal service revoked special mailing privileges held by the NRA, a nonprofit organization. 
Remanding the case, the court noted that "[d]ue process can be satisfied by allowing the appli-
cant . . . to fully present any evidence . . . by means such as submission of documents and 
informal meetings .... Further, if the Postal Service has uncovered any information that would 
disqualify the party concerned, [it] must present this evidence to the party for rebuttal." Id. at 95. 
In Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1982), the court con-
sidered the government's administrative costs in determining the scope of the process due, holding 
that warning letters and informal meetings provided sufficient protection of plaintiff's due pro-
cess rights. 
51. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1079 (7th Cir. 1982). 
53. See supra note 15. Courts have consistently held, when considering whether a particular 
statute requires a hearing on the record, that entirely different presumptions govern in cases 
of rulemaking and adjudication. In the rulemaking context, a statute must almost specifically 
require that the hearing be held "on the record" before a court would so hold. In contrast, 
there is less emphasis placed on express language of the statute in the adjudicatory context. Seacoast 
Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 
F.2d 1253, 1262 n.30 (9th Cir. 1977). These cases relied on the guidance of the Attorney General's 
Manual, which states that: 
a statutory provision that rules be issued after a hearing, without more, should not 
be construed as requiring agency action "on the record," but rather as merely requir-
ing an opportunity for the expression of views .... No such rationale applies to ad-
ministrative adjudication. In fact, it is assumed that where a statute specifically pro-
vides for administrative adjudication ... after opportunity for a hearing, such specific 
requirement for a hearing ordinarily implies the further requirement of a decision in 
accordance with evidence adduced at the hearing. 
A.G. MANUAL, supra note 24, at 42-43; see also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 
U.S. 224, 239 (1973) (The meaning of the term "hearing" will vary, "depending on whether 
it is used in the context of a rulemaking-type proceeding or in the context of a proceeding devoted 
to the adjudication of particular disputed facts.") 
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viding flexible procedural safeguards, furthers the goal of fairness in 
a way that the opposite interpretation could not. The concept of a 
"hearing" covers a broad range of procedures. 54 In some contexts, 
courts might interpret section 558(c) to require a trial-type hearing with 
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. In other contexts, 
a hearing may be more limited. Thus, by interpreting section 558(c) 
to require a hearing, a court gains the flexibility to provide a remedy 
roughly proportional to the outcome of its fairness balance. 
c. Objections to a hearing requirement- Two arguments can be 
made to suggest that a hearing requirement is not appropriate in the 
context of section 558(c). First, because a licensee is already protected 
by the due process clause, there may be no need to provide another 
set of flexible remedies. ss Second, section 558(c) may have already struck 
the balance, concluding that the cost of providing hearings is always 
so great as to preclude their use. 
In practice, the due process clause affords only limited protection 
to licensees facing suspension or revocation. Most often, in cases where 
the due process clause would require a hearing, the governing statute 
already does so. 56 When the governing statute or regulations do not 
require a hearing, courts rarely find that the due process clause does. 57 
Section 558(c) should be read to provide licensees with protection 
greater than that afforded by the due process clause. Although the 
Constitution protects property and liberty interests generally, section 
558(c) protects federal license interests specifically. The drafters of the 
AP A sought to codify the kind of fairness embodied in constitutional 
due process analysis. 58 The very fact that Congress wrote section 558(c), 
54. See supra note 7. 
55. See Note; supra note 6, at 1449-56. The analysis that a court would apply to determine 
whether the due process clause requires that a hearing be held is, to some extent, parallel to the 
· analysis under§ 558(c). Under the APA, the court would first consider whether a federal license was 
involved; under the due process clause, the question is whether the license is an interest subject 
to fifth amendment protection. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The second question 
under the APA is what procedural requirements are imposed by§ 558(c). Under the due process 
clause, the court must similarly ask: "What process is due?" 
56. For example, occupational licenses are entitled to due process protections. See Rogge, 
An Overview of Administrative Due Process, 19 Vni. L. REv. 1 (1973); Note, Due Process Limita-
tions on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097 (1973). Thus, when Congress gives an 
agency power to license an occupation, it usually requires a hearing before that license is withdrawn. 
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §.85 (1982) (licensed grain inspector); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982) (securities 
broker-dealer registration); 19 U.S.C. § 164l(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (customs broker license). 
57. See, e.g., Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982); Taylor 
v. District Eng'rs, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (5th Cir. 1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 
1253, 1265 (9th Cir. 1977); New York Pathological & X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, 523 
F.2d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1975) (Moore, J ., ~issenting); Lincoln Transit Co. v. United States, 
256 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (three-judge panel). But see Blackwell College of Business 
v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
58. Before both the House and the Senate, sponsors referred to the bill as one designed to 
provide guarantees of "due process" in administrative procedure. 92 CONG. REc. 5656 (1946), 
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however, suggests that it intended to provide federal licensees with 
something more than the minimal constitutional protections. An inter-
pretation of section 558(c) that provides for hearings in cases where 
the due process clause does not is consistent with that intent. 
The second argument, that section 558(c) already strikes the balance, 
is consistent with the premise that Congress intended the AP A to pro-
vide fairness. Yet it suggests that Congress concluded that the costs 
of providing an agency hearing in section 558(c) contexts always 
outweighs any potential for wrongful deprivation of a licensee. Thus, 
the argument is made that the balance always tips against providing 
a hearing. A close analysis of the marginaP9 cost of a hearing require-
ment, however, dispels this theory. 
To analyze the validity of the premise that section 558(c) hearings 
are always too expensive, the burdens introduced by a hearing require-
ment must be identified. This can be done by considering whether, 
and to what extent, such a requirement would affect the litigation 
strategies of licensees. For purposes of this analysis, licensees can be 
subdivided into three types: indifferent licensees, cost-conscious licensees, 
and litigious licensees. The total cost of the proposed interpretation 
would then be the marginal increase in costs to agencies as a result 
of the actions of each type of licensee, multiplied by the number of 
licensees of each type. 
The indifferent licensees, even if given the chance, would not avail 
themselves of the opportunity for agency hearings. 60 In the absence 
of a right to an agency hearing, these same licensees would not pursue 
their cases in court. 61 Thus, in this situation, the marginal cost of the 
hearing requirement would be zero. 
An examination of the analogous case of license issuance indicates 
that the category of indifferent licensees would probably be large. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations provide that any per-
son may petition for a hearing to contest the terms of a water pollu-
tion discharge permit. The regulations require that any industry claim-
ing the effluent limitations set by the EPA are too stringent may raise 
its objections at such a hearing. The EPA must grant a hearing if the 
reprinted in LEms. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 373 (comments of Rep. Gywnne, member of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary}; 92 CoNo. REC. 2149 (1946), reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, 
supra note 11, at 298 (Sen. McCarran's comments}. It is unlikely that the sponsors sought to 
do no more than codify a protection that was already provided by the Constitution. More likely, 
the drafters meant to incorporate, in the APA, a due process-like model of fairness. 
59. Marginal cost, rather than total cost, is the appropriate criterion because the concern 
is with the difference between an interpretation of § 558(c} that does require hearings and an 
interpretation that does not. 
60. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
61. In general, judicial review of informal agency adjudication is rarely sought. S. BREYER 
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 525 (1979). 
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party raises substantial issues of fact. 62 By 1977, after four years of 
the program's existence, over 40,000 dischargers had applied for per-
mits. Of those, only about 200, or five percent, had requested ad-
judicatory hearings. 63 Thus, ninety-five percent of the holders of this 
federal license were indifferent licensees. This suggests that a licensee 
subject to revocation or suspension is likely either to accept the agency 
decision or to resolve any differences with the agency prior to the final 
determination. 
Agency hearings requested by the cost-conscious licensees will place 
an administrative burden on the agencies. These licensees would carefully 
weigh the cost of litigation before taking any action. To the extent 
that an agency hearing is less costly than a court proceeding, there 
would be more requests for agency hearings than there would be for 
judicial hearings, if the latter were the only option. 64 
The magnitude of the burden placed on the agencies by the cost-
conscious licensees depends on two factors. One factor is how many 
licensees would request agency hearings. 65 The other factor is the cost 
of those hearings. Because of the great range of agency programs that 
fall within the scope of section 558(c), it is difficult to predict this 
cost. There is, however, evidence that the cost is manageable. 
The decisions of a number of federal and state agencies to provide 
hearings before revocation or suspension of licenses suggest that the 
cost of providing hearings is not excessive. Many federal agencies, not 
compelled to do so by statute, have promulgated regulations making 
hearings available prior to license suspension or revocation. 66 A number . 
of state administrative codes also provide for trial-type hearings prior 
to revocation or suspension of licenses administered by state agencies. 67 
62. 40 C.F.R. § 124.74-75, 124.75(a)(l) (1983). 
63. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedure at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IowA 
L. REv. 839, 896 n.287 (1977); see also Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 215 (1980); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 834 n.14 (7th Cir. 1977). 
64. Even if the licensee expects to lose its case, there is one occasion where it might seek 
an agency hearing - when delay would be of benefit. See Gardner, The Informal Actions of 
the Federal Government, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 799, 813-14 (1977). For the most part, however, 
a licensee seeking delay would be willing either to request an agency hearing or to go to court. 
Thus, the choice of interpretation of § 558(c) will not result in increased marginal cost from 
frivolous requests for hearings. 
Moreover, the agency controls the period of delay and, thus, the licensee's incentive to litigate. 
In any license revocation proceeding the agency should require little time to proceed to hearing. 
Under § 558(c), it must give the licensee notice of the alleged infractions and an opportunity 
to comply before instituting the revocation action. As a result, the agency should have gathered 
all the facts necessary to support its decision prior to that notice. Further, because the agency 
hearings required by the proposed interpretation of § 558(c) would be less formal than court 
proceedings, they could ·be less time consuming. 
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra note 16. 
67. See Note, Roger's Beauty School v. Michigan State Board of Cosmetology: license Revoca-
tion and Procedural Due Process, 1977 DE'r. C.L. REv. 167, 170-74 (citing statutes of several states). 
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Thus, agencies and legislators who have apparently considered the same 
issues of relative cost and benefit have decided that the burden of pro-
viding hearings is not an impracticable one. 
This increase in marginal costs must be balanced with the decrease 
in marginal costs that would occur in the case of litigious licensees. 
These lfoensees, either because they were convinced of the merits of 
their cases or because they would be so aggrieved by the loss of their 
licenses, would challenge the suspension or revocation in whatever forum 
was available. In the absence of a provision for an agency hearing, 
these licensees would go into court for temporary restraining orders 
and, later, for injunctive relief. 68 
In most cases, the agency will be the low cost dispute-resolver. 69 
It possesses expertise in the particular area of licensing in dispute. Unlike 
the court, it does not have to be educated in the matters before it. 
The agency is likely to have an ongoing relationship with the particular 
licensee. It may have dealt with very similar factual and legal issues 
in the past. Given its understanding of the issues, the agency is better 
able to limit the scope of the hearing to relevant matters. 
To the extent that disputes can be finally resolved at the agency level, 
there would be a cost savings by virtue of the efficiency of the agency 
proceeding. Yet, even in cases where the licensee appealed the agency 
decision, cost savings are likely to result. If the licensee is required 
first to petition the agency for a hearing, the courts are saved the burden 
of deciding whether or not to issue a temporary restraining order. More 
importantly, the case would arrive in the court with some record10 
of the agency proceedings and with the issues clearly focused by the 
parties. 11 
68. See, e.g., Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1071 (7th Or. 1982); New 
York Pathological & X-Ray Laboratories, Inc. v. INS, S23 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 197S). See generally 
L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AoMINISTRATIVE ACTION 687-97 (1965). 
69. An agency hearing will often be leM rigorous and, therefore, less costly than the trial-
type hearing that a court would provide. See infra notes 9S-101 and accompanying text; see 
also 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 2S, § 13:6, at 491, § 13:1.5, at .520. Although a trial court may 
summarily deny injunctive relief on a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, 
similar cost saving summary procedures are available to the agency decision maker. See infra 
notes 77-93 and accompanying text; see also 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 2.5, § 14:7, at 31-34. 
70. Under the interpretation proposed by this Note, a transcript of the agency hearing may 
not be required. If it is not, the record might simply contain the order of the agency, any af-
fidavits submitted by parties, and any written records prepared by the agency on the case. See 
generally Pedersen, supra note 32. 
71. The marginal cost may be increased if the agencies overreact to court holdings. For in-
stance, a court may remand a case to a particular agency, noting that, because factual"issues 
are in dispute, an opportunity to cross-examine and rebut the agency's evidence is required. The 
agency might overreact in two ways. It might provide for hearings even when the licensee wouid 
not be able to show that factual issues are in dispute. It might also provide for a full adjudicatory 
hearing when a "paper hearing" would have been sufficient. This danger is avoidable if the 
agencies realize that a spectrum of procedural tools are available, and that they may pick the 
WINTER 1984) APA Section 558(c) 401 
Thus, neither of the objections to the contention that hearings are 
vital to flexibility, and thereby to fairness under the AP A, is persuasive. 
The AP A should be interpreted to provide greater protection to licensees 
than the due process clause. Further, the costs imposed on agencies 
by a hearing requirement are not so excessive as to preclude an inter-
pretation of section 558(c) that imposes a hearing requirement. 
2. Exceptions to the hearing requirement- Although, as a general 
rule, the policies of the AP A are best served by an interpretation of 
section 558(c) that requires a hearing, several exceptions to the general 
rule are necessary. Section 558(c) and its legislative history mandate 
three exceptions, and the policies of fairness and uniformity provide 
two more. 
a. Explicit exceptions- There are two instances when the language 
of section 558(c) expressly exempts an agency from the hearing require-
ment. The first is the case where noncompliance with the terms of the 
license is clearly "willful. " 12 A second exists in cases of emergency, 
when "public health, interest, or safety" requires immediate action. 73 
The legislative history cautions that both of these exceptions must be 
narrowly construed in favor of the licensee. 74 
The committee reports establish a third exception for temporary 
licenses. 75 With some qualifications, the courts have consistently treated 
licenses granted on an interim or emergency basis as exempted from 
the requirements of section 558(c). 76 
one that is least burdensome and yet consistent with the court's remand. See Vermont Yankee 
.Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546-57 (1978); cf. 
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Values and Procedural 
Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing Cases, 16 SAN Draoo L. REv. 301, 305 (1979). 
72. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982); see, e.g., American Fruit Purveyors, Inc. v. United States, 
630 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 947 (1981); Silverman v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); 
Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965); KWK Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 337 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
910 (1965); A.G. MANuAL, supra note 24, at 91. 
73. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1982); cf. Nevada Airlines, Inc. v. Bond, 622 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 
1980); Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302 110th Cir. 1975); New England Air Express v. CAB, 
194 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
74. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 41, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 275; 
S. REP., supra note 11, at 25-26, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note i1, at 211. 
75. The Senate Report asserts that § 558 "does not apply to temporary permits or temporary 
licenses." S. REP., supra note 11, at 26, reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 212; 
see also id., at 43 app. 8., reprinted in LE0IS. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 229; H.R. REP., supra 
note 25, at 41, reprinted in LEors. HISTORY, supra note 11, at 275; A.G. MANUAL, supra note 
24, at 91. 
76. An agency may not avoid the application of§ 558 by describing a license as temporary. 
Compare Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217, 220-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
366 U.S. 965 (1961) (§ 558(c) not applicable to interim CAB exemptions) with CAB v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 329 (1961) (analogous FAA statute interpreted to afford hearing 
rights prior to alteration of a conditional certificate of public convenience). 
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b. Implicit exceptions- There may be cases where the cost of pro-
viding a hearing would be so great and the potential for wrongful 
deprivation of a licensee so small that no hearing will be required under 
section 558(c). This exception to the hearing requirement should be 
rarely invoked. Because the hearing requirement is so flexible, an agency, 
or court on review, should make the fairness balance a factor in deciding 
what type of hearing to grant, rather than considering it in its initial 
decision whether to grant a hearing at all. 
The fairness policy also implicitly sanctions an exception for those 
cases when nothing that the licensee is prepared to prove at the hear-
ing is relevant to the agency decision. If it can be accurately deter-
mined, prior to hearing, that the licensee's evidence would not result 
in a reversal of the revocation or suspension decision, the licensee is 
not wrongfully deprived. 
An agency decision to deny a hearing on this ground is similar to 
granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment in judicial 
proceedings. 77 As in those cases, the agency and the courts must have 
a standard upon which to judge the sufficiency of the facts alleged. 78 
It is therefore suggested that a hearing should be granted by an agency 
when the licensee demonstrates that factual disputes exist with respect 
to issues of consequence to the agency decision. 79 This requirement 
has two components: (1) the issue must be one of fact; and (2) it must 
be relevant to the agency decision to revoke or suspend. For the pur-
poses of this proposed standard, a factual issue is one that presents 
a question that can be answered with a descriptive statement, rather 
than with a prescriptive judgment. 80 
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings). If the 
agency bases its decision on offers of proof in addition to the licensee's petition for a hearing, 
the analogous judicial procedure is summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (offer of proof 
may include pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits). 
78. The test applied in ruling on a motion to dismiss is whether it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. 5 C. WiuoHT & 
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 600-02 (1969). A motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings is granted if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue 
of fact remains and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. § 1368, at 690. In 
the case of summary judgment, the standard is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
79. The procedural junction for making this threshold determination would be an agency's 
ruling on a petition for a hearing. An agency decision not to grant a licensee's hearing request 
should include reasons for the denial. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 124.75(b) (1983). The denial could 
then be appealed to the courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 7<J2 (1982). 
For an example of a commendable effort by the FDA to define those circumstances when 
it will grant a hearing, see 21 C.F.R. § 12.24(b) (1983); see also 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 69, 
§ 14.2, at 7-10. 
80. Factual issues raise "is" questions. Is the licensee engaging in (or did the licensee engage 
in) X behavior? Is the agency responding (or did the agency respond) with Y behavior? Prescrip-
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In order to succeed in its petition for a hearing, a licensee should 
be required to show that there is a factual dispute and that it is prepared 
to submit evidence relevant to that dispute. 81 A hearing should not 
be granted to debate prescriptive rules that have been settled by the 
courts, by the legislature, or by the agency. 82 
A licensee will most likely always be able to find evidence relevant 
to some factual dispute. Thus, the second requirement - that the fac-
tual dispute be of consequence to the agency decision - is likely to 
be a deciding factor in determining whether to hold a hearing. 83 A factual 
tive issues, on the other hand, are those that require "ought" judgments. Ought the licensee's 
conduct be punished with suspension or revocation? 
Efforts, in the due process context, to define "fact" by drawing distinctions between fact 
and law, and fact and policy, have proven confusing to the courts. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, 
supra note 61, at 674 n.81; Cooper, Goldberg's Forgotten Footnote: Is There a Due Process 
Right to a Hearing Prior to the Termination of Welfare Benefits When the Only Issue Raised 
is a Question of Law?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1107, 1125-26 (1980). Rather than merely answering 
the first question, whether an issue is factual, these distinctions tend to embody a determination 
of relevance as well. Professor Davis has attempted to refine the distinction between law and 
fact by distinguishing "adjudicative facts," facts specific to the activities of the parties, from 
"legislative facts," facts relevant generally to discretionary policy choices of the agency. Accord-
ing to Davis, a trial should only be granted to develop "adjudicative facts." 3 K. DAVIS, supra 
note 25, §§ 14:3-14:4, at 10-242; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, §§ 12:1-12:3, at 406-15. But see 
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975). Application of the 
test urged by this Note will result in some type of hearing for all issues of "adjudicative fact" 
and some issues of "legislative fact." See Rolfe, supra note 10, at 129-30 (suggesting that there 
are times when legislative facts should be "ventilated" in an agency hearing); see also Clagett, 
Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative 
Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78-79. 
Besides the danger of using the adjudicative and legislative labels in a conclusory manner (i.e., 
concluding that, because an issue should be raised at a hearing, it is "adjudicative"), this distinc-
tion creates the danger of shifting the focus from resolution of the factual issue to a dispute 
over the agency's policy choice itself. Cf. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 
872, 876 (1st Cir. 1978) (in the analogous license issuance setting); Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 
F.2d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (in the license issuance setting); see also A.G. MANUAL, supra 
note 24, at 14-15 (setting forth a similarly conclusive distinction between issues of adjudication 
and rulemaking, a distinction rightfully criticized by Professor Davis). Instead, by first requiring 
the licensee to specifically challenge descriptive issues, the agency should be able to focus the 
hearing on resolution of those issues, rather than opening the hearing to a general attack on 
its policy choice. 
81. The hearing process is a time honored means of developing such issues. See generally 
3 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, § 14:3, at II; 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, § 12:1, at 406-09. 
82. A governing statute or regulation may say that a license should be revoked if the licensee 
engages in X behavior, or that it should not be revoked if the agency misled that licensee through 
Y behavior. If all parties admit that behaviors X and Y occurred, a hearing need not be granted 
to answer the question of whether revocation or suspension should result. See Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 632 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977). 
83. See Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 63 low AL. REV. 285, 321 (1977) (suggesting that, even when a state 
statute, on its face, requires a formal hearing prior to all revocations or suspensions, it should 
not be read to require a hearing in instances when there is no factual dispute between the agency 
and the affected party); see also Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 214 (1980); S. 
BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 61, at 525 n.88; Rolfe, supra note 10, at 127-28. 
"Of consequence" is the language used to define relevance in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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dispute is clearly of consequence to the agency decision if it was 
necessary to that decision in a "but for" sense. 84 A factual dispute, 
however, is not at issue if its only relevance is to the wisdom of an 
existing law or regulation. 85 A licensee should not be permitted to 
challenge in a revocation or suspension context a factual antecedent 
of general agency policy. 86 
Whether an issue is of consequence to an agency decision is difficult 
to determine in the typical case that calls for the resolution of factual 
issues and the development of prescriptive judgments. In the license 
revocation or suspension context, there will often be questions of in-
terpretation regarding the governing statute. 87 The agency must answer 
descriptive questions and make prescriptive judgments as it interprets 
the law in the context of a specific revocation or suspension decision. 
The potential complexities of the typical case may be illustrated by 
a variation of the facts in Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton 
League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 88 In that 
case, the court upheld the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 
decision not to initiate a proceeding to revoke the construction permit 
of a nuclear power plant. The NRC is authorized to institute revoca-
FED. R. Evm. 401. Some current agency regulations use an alternative formulation, requiring 
a hearing if a party raises "genuine issues of material fact." See 40 C.F.R. § 124.114(b) (1983); 
Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (Supp. 1983). 
84. See Clagett, supra note 80, at 72-73 (stating the corollary: if the facts disputed by the 
licensee, even if resolved in the licensee's favor, would not change the agency decision, a hearing 
need not be granted). 
For example, Customs Service regulations in Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 
1069 (7th Cir. 1982), prescribed that "timely" meant entry within ten days. The plaintiff alleged 
that dates stamped on entry documents were not always accurate and that personnel shortages 
and a newly installed computer created delays in processing that caused timely entries to be treated 
as untimely. Whether or not the entries were made within ten days was an issue of fact. If these 
delays were the sole reason for the license suspension, they were of consequence to the agency 
decision. To ensure fairness, as required by § 558(c), a hearing should have been granted. 
85. In the previous example, see supra note 84, the customs broker would not be entitled 
to a hearing to present factual evidence that, based on statistics of collection data, the ten-day 
limit was arbitrary. Although the licensee might have factual evidence to submit, such as data 
on the number of brokers who filed ten days late and later became uncollectible or evidence 
on the feasibility of filing within ten days given present technology, those issues are not of conse-
quence to the immediate suspension decision. 
86. Such claims are more efficiently resolved in the agency's initial rulemaking proceeding. 
See 5 U .S.C. § 553(c) (1982). They may also be raised by directly appealing to the courts, seeking 
a ruling that the regulation is not in accord with the governing statute. 
87. For example, in Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. Simon, 687 F.2d 1067, 1069 (7th Cir. 1982), 
the governing regulation stated that the District Director was empowered to discontinue or sus-
pend the special permits of brokers that had "repeatedly failed to make timely entry without 
sufficient justification." The regulations prescribed that "timely" meant within ten days but 
did not define what was meant by "repeatedly" or "sufficient justification." Whether the plain-
tiff was out of compliance required an interpretation because no previously established rule of 
law determined whether the plaintiff's conduct fell within this statutory language. 
88. 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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tion proceedings whenever evidence not available when the construc-
tion permit was issued casts serious doubt on the safety of the reactor 
design. 89 The court suggested that, had revocation proceedings been 
instituted, section 558(c) would have required a hearing. 90 If that hear-
ing had been granted, the issue to be resolved would have been whether 
the new evidence demonstrated that the reactor design was unsafe. 
The agency, in considering whether to grant a hearing, would face 
both types of issues. Whether or not the reactor was unsafe, within 
the meaning of the governing statute, would be a prescriptive issue. 
Whether or not the new evidence was correct would be a descriptive 
question. The power plant licensee would likely be eager to present 
its own experts and to have the opportunity to cross-examine the ex-
perts that developed the new evidence. 
It can be argued that it is unnecessary and wasteful to require a 
hearing in cases where the factual dispute is relevant only to a generally 
applicable agency policy, rather than to the circumstances of the 
revocation or suspension. If the agency has the power to make policy 
choices in its interpretation of the statute, and if it can consider whatever 
evidence is available, it may simply hear and disregard the evidence 
submitted by the licensee. 91 
The policy of uniformity, however, suggests that when the licensee 
can make a showing that a factual issue (in this case the accuracy of 
the new evidence) is of consequence to the agency's prescriptive judg-
ment (here the safety determination) a hearing should be required. The 
systemic consequences of such a rule would promote uniformity. An 
agency faced with a rule requiring a hearing in this situation would 
have two options. It could continue to grant hearings whenever facts 
of consequence to the agency decision were disputed. Alternatively, it 
could promulgate rules prescribing what it considered to be "safe. " 92 
Each time such a rule was promulgated, the agency would resolve in-
terpretation problems and obviate the need to hold future hearings on 
the issue. More importantly, the rulemaking process would further the 
goal of uniformity by setting standards by which licensees could predict 
the consequences of' their acts. 93 
89. Id. at 1365. 
90. Id. at 1368. 
91. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, § 14.3, at 15-16. 
92. For example, it could specify that a certain alloy was suitable for certain components. 
It could incorporate specifications established by trade groups into its regulations. See Rolfe, 
supra note IO, at 124-25; see also SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (agencies have the 
choice between setting policy by adjudication or by rulemaking). 
93. Goals external to the APA are also served by holding a hearing even when the factual 
dispute is relevant only to a generally applicable agency policy. The very act of proceeding through 
a hearing process serves to promote reasoned decision making. See Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 
F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977) (interpreting the Clean Water Act ·to require hearings in the 
406 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:2 
B. Application of the Hearing Requirement 
The policies of fairness and uniformity also provide guidance to the 
agencies and courts in their determinations of the scope of the requisite 
hearing. A variety of hearing procedures are available to meet the re-
quirements of section 558(c). 94 The scope of the procedure used should 
depend on the type of license and the nature of the facts at issue. 
Because the hearing requirement of section 558(c) is based on a 
fairness balance, the courts must require procedural protections con-
sistent with the outcome of that balance. Thus, to some extent, the 
procedural protections required are a function of the type of license 
involved. If the potential harm resulting from a wrongful revocation 
or suspension of a particular license is great, section 558(c) requires 
more protections than if that potential harm is small. 95 
The scope of the procedure also depends on the nature of the facts 
at issue. 96 For instance, when the credibility or perception of a critical 
witness is likely to be questioned, fairness may require that an oppor-
tunity be granted to cross-examine that witness before the agency deci-
sion maker. 97 When the technical advice of an expert is likely to have 
served as the basis of an agency decision, fairness similarly may re-
quire an opportunity to cross-examine. 98 
license application context in order to promote "reasoned decisionmaking"); Rabin, supra note 
71, at 302-03; Rolfe, supra note 10, at 107 n.66; Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, Pro-
cedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1287-88 (1974). It also serves a "dignitary" 
function, giving the licensee the satisfaction of having its case heard. See Cramton, A Comment 
on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Plant Siting, 58 U. VA. L. REv. 585, 591-93 (1972); Mashaw, 
Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1981); 
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885 
(1981); Rabin, supra note 71, at 303; Thibaut, Walker, La Tour, & Houlden, supra; see also Gard-
ner, supra note 64, at 812-13 ("lilt seems plain enough that generally there should be a great 
deal more rulemaking"); Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 739, 755-56 (1976). 
94. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
95. When judging the fairness balance, a court could consider the licensee's interests in one 
of two ways. It could look to the licensee's subjective valuation of its license. Alternatively, 
it could consider the objective interests of holders of that particular type of license. The policy 
of uniformity suggests that the latter approach is appropriate. If the courts based their decisions 
solely on the equities of the parties present in court, there would be no predictable means for 
the agencies to determine what procedures are required. Only by using an objective approach 
will the courts be able to provide guidance to agencies. If a court holds that a certain agency 
procedure is inadequate, the agency would then have incentive to ·adopt a uniformly applicable 
procedure meeting the court's requirements. 
96. See generally Friendly, supra note 80, at 1282-87; Gardner, supra note 64, at 822-24; 
Verkuil, supra note 93, at 757. 
97. See Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1977); Blackwell College of 
Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1971); National Rifle Ass'n v. United 
States Postal Service, 407 F. Supp. 88, 95 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976). 
98. See Reflections on the Conduct of an Administrative Hearing, 20 Ao. L. REv. 11, 105-06, 
117-18 (1967) (panel discussion). 
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Although the legislative history specifically provides that section 558(c) 
does not require a hearing consistent with sections 556 and 557 of the 
AP A, 99 several less burdensome alternatives might be imposed. A court 
might require a "paper hearing," a hearing involving only written sub-
missions, providing some opportunity to cross-examine and present 
rebuttal evidence. 100 It might prescribe an oral hearing from which the 
decision maker would preserve his or her findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law for review. 101 In sum, a wide range of hearing alternatives 
is available. A court, after considering the type of license and the nature 
of the dispute, must require a hearing that will adequately protect the 
licensee's interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Loss of a federal license can have disastrous consequences. Individuals 
or organizations facing license revocation may look to the AP A for 
relief from what they consider incorrect agency action. Several courts 
have studied the question of whether a hearing must precede revoca-
tion or suspension and have reached contradictory results. Using the 
language of section 558(c) and a portion of the legislative history, they 
have held that a hearing is always required, or that a hearing is never 
required. 
The general policies of the APA, fairness and uniformity, are best 
served by a general rule requiring hearings. Because the interests in 
fairness and uniformity vary in different settings, hearings should not 
be required in every case, and the strength of the interests should deter-
mine the scope of the hearing. This system will provide a necessary 
check on arbitrary or unsupported agency license revocation or suspen-
sion without creating undue costs for agencies or affected parties. 
-Joan P. Snyder 
99. See supra note 3 I and accompanying text. 
100. See Friendly, supra note 80, at 1270; see also 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 25, § 12.5, at 
423; cf. National Rifle Ass'n v. United States Postal Service, 407 F. Supp. 88, 95 (D.D.C. 1976) 
(use of written submission to comply with due process right); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982) (pro-
viding, even in the formal adjudication context, for the submission of all or part of the evidence 
in written form). 
·101. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 61, at 526; Friendly, supra note 80, at 1292; 
Gardner, supra note 64, at 824. 

